Re: Solution to the energy shortage?

Kadaitcha Man wrote:
> "DanielSan" <danielsan1977@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message 
> news:bqSdnW4u5foWdIrVnZ2dnUVZ_s2tnZ2d@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> Kadaitcha Man wrote:
>>> "DanielSan" <danielsan1977@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message 
>>> news:qumdnaImur0KeIrVnZ2dnUVZ_vOdnZ2d@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>>
>>>> Godel was wrong.
>>> BWAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!
>>>
>>> Signatured.
>>>
>> Godel's Ontological Argument contains axioms that are not sufficiently 
>> self-evident.  It is not a proof.  It is an argument.
> 
> BWAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH!
> 
> Results 1 - 100 of about 2,130 English pages for Godel's "Ontological 
> Proof". (0.66 seconds)
> 
> It appears there are scholars who disagree with you. So, since you've 
> already claimed a greater expanse of skill, fame and knowledge than
Gödel, 
> what are your university qualifications, affiliations and achievements
in 
> regard to philosophy and formal logic systems?

The axioms are not sufficiently self evident.

Results 1 - 10 of about 197 for Godel's "ontological proof" 
self-evident. (0.27 seconds)

In order for an axiom to be true, it has to be self-evident.  Axiom 5 is 
not, on its own.

> 
> Names, dates, places, please.

I don't need to give them to you. It is evident that you don't know what 
Godel's Ontological Argument is.

> 
>> But, go ahead and signature me out of context if it makes you feel like
an 
>> adult.  You see, unlike you, I don't really care what others think
about 
>> me because they're going to form opinions about me based upon their 
>> experience with me, not because you post a short three-word sentence
with 
>> no context.
> 
> I recommend you begin asserting your supremacy over "one of the most 
> significant logicians of all time" by signing up for editing rights on 
> wikipedia. Apparently it's listed there as "Gödel's ontological proof".

 From your cite:

Critique of definitions and axioms

There are several reasons Gödel's axioms may not be realistic, including 
the following:

     * It may be impossible to properly satisfy axiom 3, which assumes 
that a conjunction of positive properties is also a positive property; 
for the proof to work, the axiom must be taken to apply to arbitrary, 
not necessarily finite, collections of properties. Moreover, some 
positive properties may be incompatible with others. For example mercy 
may be incompatible with justice. In that case the conjunction would be 
an impossible property and G(x) would be false of every x. Ted Drange 
has made this objection to the coherence of attributing all positive 
properties to God - see this article for Drange's list of incompatible 
properties and some counter arguments. For these reasons, this axiom was 
replaced in some reworkings of the proof (including Anderson's, below) 
by the assumption that G(x) is positive (Pos(G(x)).
     * The set of all properties of any object a as a candidate for the 
set of all positive properties is always consistent with axioms 1–4 
concerning positive properties, because the true statements P(a) form a 
class of statements closed under deduction. Any one property could be 
claimed to be positive, so long as it is not self-contradictory, with 
the right choice of a. Specifically, any property that can be possessed 
without contradiction is positive in some model of axioms 1–4, and any 
property that can be avoided without contradiction is non-positive in 
some model of axioms 1–4. Positivity of a property is as implicitly 
defined as anything can get. Why, then, should any one property (such as 
the one addressed in axiom 5) be assumed to be positive, given that no 
such statement is ever a tautology (although it can be a contradiction 
if the property is unsatisfiable)? Note that, with the right choice of 
axiom 5, all sorts of things could be proven (see also the objection 
below), an error common in some form to all ontological arguments. This 
problem with axiom 5 is a logically inescapable point, and is similar to 
the demonstration that, in the deontic logic of Ernst Mally, a statement 
is morally necessary if and only if it is true.
     * It was argued by Jordan Sobel that Gödel's axioms are too strong: 
they imply that all possible worlds are identical. He proved this result 
by considering the property "is such that X is true", where X is any 
true modal statement about the world. If g is a Godlike object, and X is 
in fact true, then g must possess this property, and hence must possess 
it necessarily. But then X is a necessary truth. A similar argument 
shows that all falsehoods are necessary falsehoods. C. Anthony Anderson 
gave a slightly different axiomatic system which attempts to avoid this 
problem.

In Anderson's system, Axioms 1, 2, and 5 above are unchanged; however 
sthe other axioms are replaced with:

     Axiom 3': G(x) is positive.
     Axiom 4': If a property is positive, its negation is not positive.

These axioms leave open the possibility that a Godlike object will 
possess some non-positive properties, provided that these properties are 
contingent rather than necessary.

> 
> BWAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHA! You less than ****ing useless atheist pillock.
> 

Godel is one of the most significant logicians of all time.  He wasn't 
infallible, though.

By the way, how old are you?  Maturity-wise, that is?  You don't seem to 
be able to converse without using 3rd-grade schoolyard-style insults.

Grow up.